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Abstract
My work over more than three decades has focused on the development and application of interactive
problem solving: an unofficial, scholar-practitioner approach to the resolution of protracted, deep-rooted, and
often violent conflicts between identity groups, which is derived from the pioneering work of John Burton and
anchored in social-psychological principles. My primary focus over the years has been on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, but my students and associates have also applied the approach in a number of other arenas
of ethnonational conflict, including Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and South Africa. A
starting point of this work has been the assumption that the nonviolent termination of such conflicts must go
beyond conflict settlement centered on interest-based bargaining, and aim for conflict resolution centered on
joint development of solutions that address the needs and allay the fears of both parties. We have viewed
interactive problem solving as a form of conflict resolution that is conducive to ultimate reconciliation.
Increasingly, however, we have come to see reconciliation as a distinct process of peacemaking, which must
accompany conflict resolution in deep-rooted conflicts between identity groups. Whereas conflict resolution
refers to the process of shaping a mutually satisfactory and hence durable agreement between the two
societies, reconciliation refers to the process whereby they learn to live together in the post-conflict
environment. Following this logic, the paper conceptualizes conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and
reconciliation as three qualitatively distinct processes, operating at the level of interests, relationships, and
identity respectively. These three processes may be related sequentially, but they may also operate
independently and simultaneously. The paper addresses the special challenge of reconciliation, which requires
some changes in each party’s identity, without threatening the core of its identity; and concludes with a brief
discussion of the conditions conducive to reconciliation.
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INTRODUCTION 
 My work over more than three decades has focused on the development and 
application of interactive problem solving: an unofficial, scholar-practitioner approach to 
the resolution of protracted, deep-rooted, and often violent conflicts between 
identity groups—particularly ethnonational groups—which is derived from the 
pioneering work of John Burton and anchored in social-psychological principles 
(Kelman 1999c; 2002). My primary focus over the years has been on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, but my students and associates have also applied the approach in 
a number of other arenas of ethnonational conflict, including Cyprus, Northern 
Ireland, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and South Africa.  
 The central distinction in our work, following John Burton, has been between 
settlement and resolution of conflict (see for example Burton 1969, Chapters 11 and 12). 
In contrast to the negotiation of a political settlement, a process of conflict resolution 
goes beyond a realist view of national interests. It explores the causes of the conflict, 
particularly causes in the form of unmet or threatened needs for identity, security, 
recognition, autonomy, and justice. It seeks solutions responsive to the needs of 
both sides through active engagement in joint problem solving.  Hence, agreements 
achieved through a process of genuine conflict resolution—unlike compromises 
achieved through a bargaining process brokered or imposed by third parties—are 
likely to engender the two parties’ long-term commitment to the outcome and to 
transform their relationship. Our work starts with the assumption that the 
nonviolent termination of conflicts between identity groups requires a process of 
conflict resolution of the kind that I have briefly described.  
SETTLEMENT, RESOLUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 
Although there are obvious continuities between conflict settlement and conflict 
resolution, they can be conceptualized as two distinct processes of peacemaking, 
with a primary focus at the level of interests and at the level of relationships, 
respectively. Let me compare the two processes in somewhat fuller detail.  
 Conflict settlement can be described as a process yielding an agreement that 
meets the interests of both parties to the extent that their respective power positions 
enable them to prevail. In other words, the terms of their agreement are heavily 
determined by the power they can bring to bear in the negotiations. Third parties—
outside powers or international organizations—often play a role in brokering or even 
imposing an agreement, using their own power by way of threats or inducements. 
The agreement may be supported by the publics on the two sides because they are 
tired of war and have found the status quo of continuing hostility and uncertainty 
increasingly intolerable. Such support of the agreement does not rest in any 
particular change in public attitudes toward the adversary. The settlement process is 
not especially designed to change the quality of the relationship between the 
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societies. The stability of a political settlement ultimately depends on surveillance—
by the parties themselves, in keeping with their deterrent capacities, by outside 
powers, and by international organizations. 
 Conflict settlement is not a negligible achievement in a violent and destructive 
relationship with escalatory potential. In fact, conflict resolution can often build on 
political settlements, insofar as these involve a negotiating process in which each side 
pursues its interests and in which they are able to reach agreement on many 
outstanding issues through distributive bargaining in which power as well as 
international norms play a role. But conflict resolution, particularly if we think of it 
within an interactive problem-solving framework, goes beyond conflict settlement in 
many of the ways to which I have already alluded: 
• It refers to an agreement that is arrived at interactively, rather than imposed 
or sponsored by outside powers, and to which the parties therefore have 
a higher level of commitment. 
• It addresses the parties’ basic needs and fears and therefore has a greater 
capacity to sustain itself over time. 
• It builds a degree of working trust between the parties—a pragmatic trust 
in the other’s interest in achieving and maintaining peace—and therefore 
is not entirely dependent on surveillance as the guarantor of the 
agreement (for the distinction between working trust and interpersonal 
trust, see Kelman 2005). 
• It establishes a new relationship between the parties, best described as a 
partnership, in which the parties are responsive to each other’s needs and 
constraints, and committed to reciprocity.  
• It generates public support for the agreement and encourages the 
development of new images of the other. 
In all of these ways, conflict resolution moves beyond the interest-based 
settlement of the conflict and its dependence on the balance of power. It represents 
a strategic change in the relationship between the parties, expressed in terms of a 
pragmatic partnership, in which each side is persuaded that stable peace and 
cooperation are both in its own best interest and in the interest of the other. This is 
the kind of partnership that began to emerge, especially at the leadership level, 
between Israelis and Palestinians in the early post-Oslo environment (cf. Lustick 
1997). 
 Conflict resolution as I have described it clearly represents a transformation of 
the relationship between the parties (cf. Lederach 1998; Kelman 1999a). But there 
are limits to this new relationship, which make it vulnerable to changes in interests, 
circumstances, and leadership. Conflict resolution as a process of peacemaking 
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involves the development of a new relationship, with an associated set of new 
attitudes alongside—or perhaps on top—of the old attitudes. The new attitudes are 
not necessarily integrated with one’s pre-existing value structure and belief system—
with one’s worldview. This means that the old attitudes—including attitudes of 
fundamental distrust and negation of the other—remain intact even as new attitudes, 
associated with the new relationship, take shape. The coexistence of new attitudes 
toward the other as a potential partner in peace with old attitudes toward the other as 
a mortal enemy creates instability in the new relationship, particularly in the context 
of an existential identity conflict. Changing circumstances may trigger the old 
attitudes in their full force. 
 This brings us to what I propose is a third, distinct, process of peacemaking: 
reconciliation, with a primary focus at the level of identities. I have always argued that 
an agreement emerging from a process of conflict resolution within an interactive 
problem-solving framework and the new relationship it promotes are conducive to 
stable peace, mutually enhancing cooperation, and ultimate reconciliation. 
 Thus, reconciliation, in this view, is a consequence of successful conflict 
resolution. It comes at the end of the process, with time: The test of a good 
agreement, and of the process that generates it, is its conduciveness to ultimate 
reconciliation. This does not mean (and has never meant, in my view) that 
reconciliation comes into play only after an agreement has been reached. 
Reconciliation is, after all, a process as well as an outcome; as such, it should ideally be 
set into motion from the beginning of a peace process and as an integral part of it. In 
this spirit, I have proposed that the problem-solving workshops between politically 
influential Israelis and Palestinians that my colleagues and I have organized for some 
years (see Kelman 2002; Rouhana & Kelman 1994) represent tentative steps toward 
reconciliation, insofar as participants are encouraged to listen to and to try to 
appreciate each other’s narrative and to engage in a process of “negotiating identity” 
(Kelman 2001). 
 Although reconciliation has been vital to my thinking in these and other ways, 
I tended to conceive of it not so much as a separate process, but as a component and 
logical outcome of conflict resolution as my colleagues and I have conceptualized 
and practiced it. But the recent events that have increasingly focused the attention of 
social scientists and political actors on reconciliation have encouraged me, along with 
my colleagues, to view reconciliation as a distinct process, qualitatively different from 
conflict resolution—even conflict resolution within a needs-oriented, interactive 
problem-solving framework.  Reconciliation is obviously continuous with and linked 
to conflict resolution and it certainly is not an alternative to it. But, whereas conflict 
resolution refers to the process of achieving a mutually satisfactory and hence 
durable agreement between the two societies, reconciliation refers to the process 
whereby the societies learn to live together in the post-conflict environment. 
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Reconciliation presupposes conflict resolution of the type that I have described: 
the development of working trust; the transformation of the relationship toward a 
partnership based on reciprocity and mutual responsiveness; an agreement that 
addresses both parties’ basic needs. But it goes beyond conflict resolution in 
representing a change in each party’s identity. 
 The primary feature of the identity change constituting reconciliation is the 
removal of the negation of the other as a central component of one’s own identity. 
My main empirical point of reference in this analysis is the Israeli-Palestinian case, in 
which mutual denial of the other’s identity has been a central feature of the conflict 
over the decades (cf. Kelman 1978; 1999b). The mutual negation of the other’s 
identity is perhaps not as central in other cases of conflict and reconciliation—such 
as those of Chile, Guatemala, or South Africa, or the German-Jewish, the Franco-
German, or even the Egyptian-Israeli case—yet, in each case, the negation of the 
other is somehow embedded in the identity of each of the conflicting parties and 
must be addressed in the reconciliation process. 
 Changing one’s collective identity by removing the negation of the other from 
it implies a degree of acceptance of the other’s identity—at least in the sense of 
acknowledging the validity and legitimacy of the other’s narrative without necessarily 
fully agreeing with that narrative. The change in each party’s identity may go further 
by moving toward the development of a common, transcendent identity—not in lieu 
of, but alongside of each group’s particularistic identity. Development of a 
transcendent identity becomes possible with reconciliation and, in turn, reinforces 
reconciliation, but is not a necessary condition or consequence of reconciliation. 
What is essential to reconciliation, in my view, is that each party revise its own 
identity just enough to accommodate the identity of the other. As the parties 
overcome the negative interdependence of their identities, they can build on the 
positive interdependence of their identities that often characterizes parties living in 
close proximity to each other (Kelman 1999b). 
 Reconciliation as I have defined it goes beyond conflict resolution in that it 
moves past the level of pragmatic partnership—which is essential to peacemaking—
and enables the parties to internalize the new relationship, integrating it into their 
own identities. New attitudes toward the other can thus develop, not just alongside 
of the old attitudes, but in place of the old attitudes. As the new attitudes become 
integrated into the group’s own identity, they gradually replace the old attitudes. 
Working trust can gradually turn into personal trust. This does not foreclose the 
possibility that old fears and suspicions will reemerge, but the relationship is less 
vulnerable to situational changes. 
 It is important to emphasize that the change in each party’s identity—the 
revision in its narrative—that I am defining as reconciliation implies a strengthening, 
rather than a weakening, of each party’s core identity. I would argue that a revision in 
4
Landscapes of Violence, Vol. 1 [2010], No. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/lov/vol1/iss1/5
DOI: 10.7275/R5H12ZX0
the group’s identity and the associated narrative is possible only if the core of the 
identity remains intact. In fact, changes in more peripheral elements of identity are 
often seen as necessary in order to preserve the core of the identity. This was the 
basis, for example, on which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians were (and I 
believe continue to be) prepared to revise the territorial dimension of their national 
identity in order to maintain the essence of that identity (Kelman 2001). 
This analysis points to a major dilemma of reconciliation. Reconciliation requires 
parties to change an element of their identity—the negation of the other—which is 
far from trivial for parties engaged in an existential identity conflict, while at the 
same time preserving, even strengthening, the core of their identity. This is more 
easily achieved in situations in which one of the parties has already rejected part of its 
identity—as was the case for many Germans in post-Nazi Germany and many whites 
in post-apartheid South Africa—although even in these situations resistances are 
bound to arise. It is particularly difficult, however, in conflicts in which each side 
insists on the justice of its cause and sees itself as having been wronged by the other. 
The dilemma is that the amount and kind of identity change that A requires from B 
in order to be ready for reconciliation may be perceived by B as undermining the 
core of its identity. A good example here would be the demand to acknowledge 
collective guilt to which even post-Nazi Germany was reluctant to accede (Auerbach 
2004; Feldman 1999).  
In conflicts such as that between Palestinians and Israelis, negation of the other 
is a central element of each party’s own identity, which it cannot give up easily. Given 
the nature of the conflict, each party finds it necessary to deny the other’s 
authenticity as a people, the other’s links to the land, and the other’s national rights, 
especially its right to national self-determination through the establishment of an 
independent state in the land both claim, because the other’s claims to peoplehood 
and to rights in the land are seen as competitive to each party’s own claims and 
rights. Moreover, negation of the other is also important to each party in a violent 
conflict as a protection against negative elements in its own identity (cf. Kelman 
1999b). Insofar as the other can be demonized and dehumanized, it becomes easier 
for each party to minimize guilt feelings for acts of violence and oppression against 
the other and to avoid seeing itself in the role of victimizer, rather than only the role 
of victim. 
Thus, in protracted identity conflicts, negation of the other is not a peripheral, 
marginal element of each party’s identity that can be easily discarded. My argument is 
merely that, from an “objective” point of view, negating the identity of the other is 
not a necessary condition for preserving, and indeed enhancing the core of one’s own 
identity. However, for conflicting parties to arrive at a point where they can be free 
to relegate negation of the other to the periphery of their own identities and 
eventually discard it requires the hard work of reconciliation. What is central to that 
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work is the growing assurance that the other is not a threat to one’s own identity. In 
that process of assurance, the conditions for reconciliation play a vital role. 
Parties in a conflict in which both sides perceive themselves as victims are helped 
to deal with the dilemma of abandoning some elements of identity without 
threatening the core of their identity by the reciprocal nature of reconciliation. 
Changes on the part of one group make changes on the other’s part more attainable. 
But this view suggests that the process of reconciliation requires a certain amount of 
“negotiation” of identity, including negotiation of the conditions for reconciliation, 
which turn on such issues as truth, justice, and responsibility. It is my contention that 
reconciliation—especially in cases in which neither party is prepared to adopt the 
role of perpetrator—cannot be achieved on the basis of purely objective criteria of 
truth, justice, or responsibility, anchored in historical scholarship or international law, 
but requires some degree of mutual accommodation in the course of negotiating the 
conditions for reconciliation.  
 I can identify five conditions that may help groups in conflict arrive at the 
difficult point of revising their identity so as to accommodate the identity of the 
other. One might also think of these as indicators of reconciliation, or steps in a 
process of reconciliation. They are both indicators of movement toward 
reconciliation and conditions for further movement in that direction. I shall merely 
enumerate these conditions here; further elaboration can be found elsewhere 
(Kelman 2004; 2008). 
1. Mutual acknowledgment of the other’s nationhood and humanity, which involves 
acceptance of the other as an authentic nation and inclusion of the other 
in one’s own moral community. 
2. Development of a common moral basis for peace, allowing for a peace that both 
sides perceive as consistent with the principles of fairness and attainable 
justice. 
3. Confrontation with history, which does not require a joint consensual history, 
but does require admitting the other’s truth into one’s own narrative.  
4. Acknowledgment of responsibility, expressed in both symbolic and material 
terms. 
5. Establishment of patterns and institutional mechanisms of cooperation, including 
various people-to-people activities that are genuinely useful to both 
parties and based on the principles of equality and reciprocity.  
All five of these conditions for reconciliation are designed to facilitate changes in 
the collective identities of the conflicting parties, with particular emphasis on 
removing the negation of the other as a key element of each group’s own identity. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have conceptualized conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation 
as three qualitatively distinct processes, operating at the level of interests, 
relationships, and identities respectively (see Kelman 2004; 2006). Social 
psychologists may notice that these processes broadly correspond to the three 
processes of social influence—compliance, identification, and internalization—that I 
distinguished in my earlier work (Kelman 1958; 1961; Kelman and Hamilton 1989). 
My original three-process model grew out of an interest in the quality of changes 
induced by social influence—their depth, durability, independence, and integration. 
My approach to conflict resolution has posed a very similar set of questions: What 
are the conditions under which negotiations to end the conflict will produce a high-
quality agreement—an agreement that will be deeper, more durable, more 
sustainable, more fully integrated in the political cultures or societal belief systems 
(cf. Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004) of the conflicting societies than the settlements that 
are so often hammered together under the pressure of external powers? 
Although settlement, resolution, and reconciliation represent three approaches to 
peacemaking, they should not be viewed as three different ways of achieving the 
same goal. Rather, they are three ways of achieving different—though often 
overlapping—goals, all broadly linked to changing the relationship between groups, 
communities, societies, or states from one of hostility to one of peaceful coexistence. 
The specific goals and emphases of the three processes may be congruent and 
mutually supportive, but they may also be contradictory to one another. 
 I have already suggested that reconciliation is continuous with and linked to 
conflict resolution. In a sense, it can be argued that reconciliation, at least in its full 
form, presupposes conflict resolution: A long-term, cooperative relationship, based 
on mutual acceptance and respect, is not likely to take hold without a peace 
agreement that addresses the fundamental needs and sense of justice of both sides. 
Similarly, it can be argued that conflict resolution presupposes conflict settlement, at 
least in the sense that a political agreement negotiated by the legitimate leaderships of 
the conflicting parties and endorsed by relevant outside powers and international 
organizations must be in place if the two societies are to consider their conflict to 
have ended in a fair and mutually satisfactory way. The three processes may thus be 
related in a sequential way, with settlement as the first step, which may or may not be 
followed by resolution, which in turn may or may not be followed by reconciliation. 
However, there is no reason to assume that the three processes necessarily follow 
such a sequence. Steps in the direction or in the spirit of settlement, resolution, or 
reconciliation may occur quite independently, in any order and in any combination. 
 In short, possible relationships between the three processes need to be 
explored, conceptually and empirically, rather than assumed—or dismissed. The 
main purpose of the present exercise is to see whether we can gain some analytical 
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leverage by thinking of settlement, resolution, and reconciliation as qualitatively 
different (though not necessarily always empirically separate) processes and 
identifying the distinct antecedents and consequences of each.  
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